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Abstract 
This article analyses the negotiations on the future of the international climate regime at the United 
Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen. It also discusses key issues in the ongoing business of 
implementing the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. The article lays out the main issues at 
stake in the negotiations, contrasts divergences in interests amongst negotiating parties, and 
summarises the results achieved in Copenhagen. The report discusses these results in detail and 
concludes with an outlook on how the challenges ahead could be overcome. 
Keywords: climate change, climate policy, international climate negotiations, Kyoto Protocol, post-
2012, Copenhagen summit, North-South relations 
1. Introduction
Rarely had an event generated so much anticipation, and rarely had there been such a strong 
disappointment afterwards as at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 5th Conference of the Parties Serving 
as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in Copenhagen. According to the Bali Action 
Plan agreed at COP 13, the Copenhagen conference was to deliver a comprehensive agreement on the 
future of the climate regime. More than 100 Heads of State and Government had announced their 
attendance and more than 40,000 participants had registered their names. 
However, while progress was made on details, positions on the major areas of controversy hardly 
converged. Eventually, the conference produced a “Copenhagen Accord” which is only a political 
declaration and not even this declaration was supported by all countries.  
This article lays out the main developments in the negotiations about the future climate regime in 
Copenhagen and the contents of the Copenhagen Accord in chapters 2 and 3. In addition, the 
conference also had to deal with ongoing business related to the implementation of the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol, which is discussed in chapter 4. The article concludes with an assessment of the 
conference’s outcome and a discussion of possible ways forward. 
2. Negotiating the Future Climate Regime
2.1. Mitigation 
According to the Bali Action Plan, the mitigation negotiations are proceeding under two tracks. First, 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Countries under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP), which was established at CMP 1 in Montreal in 2005, is negotiating future emission 
targets for industrialised countries. Second, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) negotiates commitments for Annex I countries, including 
in particular those that have not ratified the Protocol—i.e. the USA—as well as “nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) of developing countries. The latter are to be supported by 
industrialised countries by technology, financing and capacity-building. 
As has been the case since the start of the climate regime, negotiations up to and in Copenhagen 
continued to be plagued by finger pointing of who should go first. Non-Annex I countries point to the 
historical responsibility of Annex I countries for creating the climate problem and insist that 
industrialised countries should therefore take the lead in combating climate change. Annex I countries 
for their part point to rapidly rising emissions in the large rapidly industrializing countries and demand 
that they need to step up their efforts as well. 
 
Apart from specific numbers and actions this controversy also revolves around the legal structure of 
the future agreement. Industrialised countries are, by varying degrees, in favour of a new universal 
framework that would supersede the Kyoto Protocol and cover all countries. Their argument is to 
make it easier to adequately cover all major emitting countries. 
 
The USA have demanded a new structure that should be “very different” from the Kyoto Protocol. 
They reject the top-down approach favoured by the EU and developing countries, according to which 
first an overall mitigation target would be decided for industrialised countries, which would then be 
broken down to the individual countries according to their relative responsibility and capability. 
According to the US proposal, the international system would mainly be a collection of actions 
decided and implemented domestically. 
 
Non-Annex I countries have denounced these positions as “killing Kyoto”. They see the Protocol as 
the only binding instrument for emission reductions the international community has so far been able 
to create and reject any suggestion to abandon it. They also see a continuation of the Protocol as a key 
prerequisite for maintaining the distinction between industrialised and developing countries. 
 
As regards the level of ambition, the “ranges table” in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report has become 
a widely discussed benchmark. According to this table, in order to achieve stabilisation of atmospheric 
concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq., Annex I countries should collectively reduce their emissions by 
25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, and non-Annex I countries should achieve a “substantial 
deviation from baseline”. The IPCC at the time did not quantify the deviation from baseline. A further 
article by the two main authors of the ranges table put the necessary deviation at 15-30% below 
business as usual.1 
 
It needs to be noted, though, that many developing countries have disputed that the two ranges 
actually constitute an equitable effort sharing. Also, stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2-eq. gives only a 
50% chance of meeting the 2°C target and hardly a chance of meeting the 1.5°C target demanded by 
the most vulnerable countries. 
 
What industrialised countries had put on the table on the surface amounted to 11-19% below 1990 
levels by 2020 However, these figures contained substantial loopholes. One is the presence of “hot 
air”, the surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) allocated to the Central and Eastern European 
economies in transition (EIT) under the Kyoto Protocol. Another loophole is the accounting rules for 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), which effectively allow countries to hide emission 
increases. Taking all these loopholes into account, agreement at Copenhagen might well have resulted 
in an Annex I emissions increase of 2-8% compared to 1990 instead of a decrease.2 
 
By contrast, the large non-Annex I countries have put substantial national action programmes on the 
table. According to the UNFCCC secretariat these would amount to a 28% deviation from BAU by 
2020 Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer summarised in his final press conference in Copenhagen, 
pledges by non-Annex I countries are at the upper end of their “range” while Annex I countries are not 
even at the lower end of the range suggested by the IPCC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 M. den Elzen, M and N. Höhne, Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries for 
Meeting Concentration Stabilisation Targets, An Editorial Comment, Climatic Change 2008 (91), p. 249. 
2 Sustainability Council of New Zealand, Loopholes Negate Pledges for Emission Reductions, 
http://www.sustainabilitynz.org/news_item.asp?sID=205. 
2.2. Adaptation 
The Copenhagen outcome on adaptation was supposed to include agreement on the institutional 
architecture of an effective and efficient adaptation framework, including provisions for an insurance 
and a rehabilitation (loss and damages) mechanism. In the end, the final text still included various 
options on most of the articles.3 
 
Contentious issues included the integration of historic responsibility, climate insurance, an 
international mechanism to address loss and damages associated with climate change impacts in 
developing countries, especially those most vulnerable to climate change, as well as the focus on most 
vulnerable communities in addition to a focus on most vulnerable countries. In the LCA draft decision 
no reference is made to most vulnerable communities or historic responsibility as such, although 
option 1 on finance for adaptation refers to the “repayment of (…) climate debt”.4 Insurance is 
included and the issue of establishing an international mechanism for loss and damages also remains 
in the text, even though in brackets.5 
 
Overall, the AWG-LCA draft decision on adaptation includes a rather comprehensive list of what 
adaptation actions could include. However, it still has various options and brackets for most of its 
elements, missing a quantification of finance for adaptation and remaining vague on the institutional 
arrangements of an adaptation framework (or programme) and how to ensure that developed countries 
will deliver on their commitments (pending decisions on finance, technology and capacity building). 
2.3. Financing 
The issue of finance had been a low priority issue in the climate negotiations for a long time. Although 
Articles 4.3, 4, 5 of the UNFCCC and Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol mandate Annex II parties to 
provide new and additional financial resources to developing countries in support of adaptation and 
mitigation, demands of developing countries for financial resources used to receive little attention. 
This has changed drastically since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan. 
 
All negotiations relevant to the finance issue have focussed on addressing either one or both of two 
topics: mobilisation of the needed amount of financial resources and the institutional structure of 
funding. 
 
On the mobilisation issue, a report on financial flows produced by the UNFCCC Secretariat put the 
financial resources needed in 2030 at $130 billion for mitigation activities and several tens or possibly 
hundreds of billions for adaptation in developing countries only.6 Other estimates come to similar or 
even higher results.7 These figures go far beyond the total amount of resource flows provided by the 
existing mechanisms within the climate regime and the resources provided through the funds 
established outside of the Convention, most notably the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund and the 
Strategic Climate Fund/Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. 
 
Regarding the institutional structure of the funding body, developing countries and industrialised 
countries have still not overcome the conflict they have had since the establishment of the Global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Draft 
conclusions proposed by the Chair, Addendum, Draft decision -/CP.15, Enhanced action on adaptation, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.1, 15 December 2009. 
4 Id. at para 5. 
5 Id. at para 8. 
6 Investment and financial flows to address climate change: an update, Technical paper, FCCC/TP/2008/7, 26 November 
2008. 
7 See e.g. Project Catalyst, Towards a Global Climate Agreement, Synthesis Briefing Paper June 2009, 2009; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey 2009, Promoting Development, Saving the 
Planet, 2009. 
Environment Facility (GEF). Annex II Parties want to provide financing through bilateral or 
established multilateral channels such as the World Bank and the GEF. They argue that the expertise 
of these institutions should be used and point to the costs and effort involved with establishing new 
institutions. By contrast, developing countries perceive the existing institutions to be donor-
dominated. They also complain that the procedures to access funding through these institutions require 
too much effort. They have therefore proposed to establish a new fund that would be fully accountable 
to the COP. 
 
Significant progress only started when Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, announced in her 
speech in Copenhagen that “The United States is prepared to work with other countries toward a goal 
of jointly mobilising 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the climate change needs of 
developing countries.”8 This figure eventually made its way into the Copenhagen Accord (see below). 
2.4. Technology 
Similar to the finance issue, technology transfer was treated as a low-priority topic in the climate 
negotiations until Bali, where it became one of the building blocks of the Bali Action Plan. 
Negotiations accelerated in 2009, leading to high expectations for Copenhagen to reach an agreement. 
 
Even though a final agreement could not be reached in the end, most of the different options in the text 
could be deleted. According to the final LCA text,9 a Technology Mechanism will be established. It 
will consist of a permanent Technology Executive Committee, which will replace the current Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer, and a Climate Technology Centre. 
 
The Executive Committee will act as oversight board to the Mechanism, and will, inter alia, provide 
analysis on policy and technical issues, prepare criteria for support eligibility, consider actions to 
remove barriers to technology transfer, as well as monitor and assess technology-related action and 
support both for adaptation and mitigation. Decisions on guidance, membership and voting rules of the 
committee have not yet been taken. 
 
The Technology Centre will be established with a view to improving the flow of information on 
available technologies, RD&D and transfer options. It will get support by regional units and by a 
climate technology network that is to be established to facilitate cooperation e.g. with national 
institutions or other international technology centres. 
 
Disagreement remains on the relationship of the Mechanism with a possible future Financial 
Arrangement under the Convention (see section 2.3).The two options currently present in the text 
would give either the Mechanism or the Arrangement more leverage over funds. 
 
Further disagreements revolve around intellectual property rights (IPRs). IPRs were firstly raised by 
China as one of the barriers preventing smooth technology transfer, which has since been taken up by 
many developing countries. By contrast, developed countries stress the necessity to keep strong IPR 
protection to encourage RD&D and deployment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 S. Goldenberg, US bids to break Copenhagen deadlock with support for $100bn climate fund, guardian.co.uk, 
http://www.gurdian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/17/us-copenhagen-100bn-climate-fund. 
9 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Draft 
conclusions proposed by the Chair, Addendum, Draft decision -/CP.15, Enhanced action on technology development and 
transfer, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.3, 15 December 2009. 
2.5. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
        Degradation (REDD) 
According to the Bali Action Plan, the future agreement is to include a policy framework for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). At Copenhagen, Parties inter alia 
discussed whether emission reference levels should be set nationally or sub-nationally. A sub-national 
approach would be implemented in a defined geographical area or at a project scale with individual 
ownership, while a national reference level would consist of a broader policy approach and create 
country ownership. The USA and others favour the former approach as it is open to wide participation 
and attractive to private investors, which could use carbon credits generated by individual project 
activities to offset domestic emissions. The EU and others, however, claim that this approach might 
encourage shifting the problem of deforestation into neighbouring areas, thereby creating a severe 
leakage problem. They argue that a national approach would allow for properly addressing the real 
drivers of deforestation and domestic leakage. However, no consensus could be reached. 
 
Further controversies revolved around targets and goals for REDD plus, safeguards, and funding for 
REDD plus activities, especially for early actions. Prior to the conference, developing country Parties 
had shown willingness to commit to targets on deforestation under the condition that Annex I Parties 
provided adequate funding. At Copenhagen, however, no consensus could be achieved on the linkages 
between financial assistance and targets. One by one, both the mid-term target and the long-term goal 
on deforestation were deleted from the negotiation text. Furthermore, Parties discussed the content of 
and the way to refer to safeguards such as the rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
The final draft of the AWG-LCA on REDD plus10 contains a placeholder for a target as to when to 
halt deforestation and to the costs of achieving that goal. It also comprises a weak reference to 
safeguards like the rights of indigenous peoples and biodiversity. Further, the text—timidly—
discourages the conversion of natural forests into plantations. 
3. The Copenhagen Accord 
As it became apparent that the AWG negotiations were not going to bridge the divides, the Danish 
presidency launched a high-level “Friends of the Chair” group in parallel to the UNFCCC process. 
This group consisted of about 30 countries who were mostly represented by their Heads of State and 
Government. As this process was separate from the UNFCCC process and took place completely 
behind closed doors there are only partial accounts of what actually happened.11 	  
At 3 am on Saturday, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen re-opened the COP plenary and explained 
that he had consulted with leaders and mobilised support for an accord. This announcement provoked 
a barrage of objections from developing countries. The objections related to both the process and the 
content. On the process, developing countries complained about the intransparency and lack of respect 
for the UN process. On content, especially SIDS and LDCs attacked the accord as much too weak.  
 
The debate dragged on until Saturday afternoon. In the end, it was not possible to formally adopt the 
Accord. Instead, the COP was only able to agree on “taking note of ” the Copenhagen Accord (CA). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Draft 
conclusions proposed by the Chair, Addendum, Draft decision -/CP.15, Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.6, 15 December 2009. 
11 One very comprehensive account is given by B. Müller, Copenhagen 2009, Failure or final wake-up call for our leaders?, 
2010, www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/EV49.pdf. 
 
On substance, the CA includes a reference to the 2°C target12 and a call for review in 2015 which 
would include consideration of the 1.5°C target, a concession to the most vulnerable countries.13 
 
The CA does not contain any mid-term or long-term emission targets, neither for countries nor 
globally. Instead, the CA initially contained two empty appendices. Annex I countries were to inscribe 
emission targets for 2020 into Appendix I by 31 January. Non-Annex I countries, except LDCs and SIDS, 
were to inscribe nationally appropriate mitigation actions in Appendix II, also by 31 January. 
 
On adaptation, the CA agrees that “enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is 
urgently required” and “that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable 
financial resources, technology and capacity building to support the implementation of adaptation 
action in developing countries”.14 
 
On financing, the CA foresees $30 billion of “new and additional resources” for the period 2010-2012 
as collective commitment by developed countries “with balanced allocation between adaptation and 
mitigation”.15  In addition, industrialised countries commit to a goal of mobilising jointly $100 billion 
a year by 2020 to meet the needs of developing countries “in the context of meaningful mitigation 
actions and transparency on implementation.” The funding is supposed to come “from a wide variety 
of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.”16 
 
The CA also establishes a “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” and a “Technology Mechanism”. 
However, the CA contains no details on their implementation.17 
 
Initially, there was no clarity on the function of the CA for the further development of the climate 
regime. Some observers thought that the CA represented a fundamental “reset” of the climate regime. 
They posited that the CA was going to be the main future framework, that it would potentially be 
developed further outside the UNFCCC and that the UNFCCC would be relegated to the function of a 
notary. However, various countries such as the BASIC countries have by now decidedly taken the 
position that the CA should serve merely as input to the AWG negotiations.18 
 
The CA and the AWG texts would then serve as complementary documents. The AWG texts have 
progressed considerably on the implementation details but agreement on the fundamental questions 
has so far been impossible. By contrast, the CA addresses some fundamental issues but has next to no 
details on implementation. It will therefore now fall to the AWG-LCA to fill in these details based on 
the current negotiation texts. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, 
Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session, Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen 
Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010, para. 1. 
13 Id. at para. 12. 
14 Id. at para. 3. 
15 Id.at para. 8. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.at paras. 10f. 
18 Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of BASIC Group, New Delhi, 
http://www.hindu.com/nic/2010draft.htm. 
4. Ongoing Business 
4.1. Adaptation 
The Adaptation Fund Board presented its progress report19 to the CMP plenary, highlighting three 
main actions taken during the reporting period to operationalise the Adaptation Fund: 
1. Adoption of policies and guidelines for accessing funds; 
2. capitalisation of the Adaptation Trust Fund through monetisation of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) started in May 2009. They estimated that up to 2012 at the very most USD 
500 million could be monetised, meaning that the fund will need resources in addition to CER 
revenues; and 
3. decision to accept Germany’s offer to confer legal capacity on and host the Adaptation Fund 
Board. Once legal capacity has been conferred to the Adaptation Fund Board—after 
finalisation of the national parliamentary process in Germany, which is expected to take place 
before the end of 2010—the Adaptation Fund Board will finally be able to enter into funding 
agreements to start concrete projects or programmes in developing countries—nine years after 
establishment of the fund had been agreed at COP 6bis in Bonn. 
4.2. Financing 
The topic of financing was taken up not only as one of the building blocks under the AWG-LCA, but 
also relating to the implementation of the existing mechanisms. Parties addressed the fourth review of 
the financial mechanism, the report of the GEF to the COP and guidance to the GEF from the COP 
under the Convention, the LDC fund, and the report from the Adaptation Fund Board (see above). 
 
The controversies around the fourth review of the Convention’s financial mechanisms were essentially 
the same ones as under the AWG-LCA. While industrialised countries stressed that they have 
provided new and additional funding for global environmental benefits to developing countries, 
developing countries argued that the support has been insufficient to cover the increasing agenda of 
the Global Environment Facility as agreed upon under the conventions served by the GEF. In the end, 
the whole decision text was bracketed and forwarded to COP 16.20 
4.3. Technology 
The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) presented its progress report for 2009 in the 
plenary. 21 The report referred especially to the EGTT’s implementation of its work and on 
“Performance indicators to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
technology transfer framework” it had drafted.22 The EGTT has sought to develop and test 40 
performance indicators for application to the framework by the SBI. The report finds that stakeholder 
involvement is key to the legitimacy of the undertaking and concedes that there is great need for 
capacity building to create appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems nationally and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Report of the Adaptation Fund Board, Note by the Chair of the Adaptation Fund Board, FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/ 14, 19 
November 2009. 
20 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, 
Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session, Decision 6/CP.15, Fourth review 
of the financial mechanism, FCCC/CP/2009/ 11/Add. 1, 30 March 2010. 
21 Report of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer for 2009, Note by the Chair of the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer, FCCC/SB/2009/INF.6, 12 November 2009. 
22 Performance indicators to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the technology transfer 
framework, Final report by the Chair of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, FCCC/SB/2009/4, 11 November 2009. 
internationally. 
 
The GEF reported its progress on the implementation of the Poznan Strategic Programme on 
Technology Transfer. Under this programme, the GEF will help developing countries to conduct or 
update their technology needs assessments and will finance pilot projects for technology transfer. In 
2009, the Programme focused on supporting developing countries with technology needs assessments 
and the build up of 14 proposals of technology transfer pilot projects.23 
 
Parties welcomed EGTT’s report on performance indicators and approved its rolling programme of 
work for 2010-2011. The EGTT will organize a regional workshop for Latin America and the 
Caribbean on preparing technology transfer projects for financing and develop an online training 
programme on preparing technology transfer projects. Furthermore, the group of experts will deal with 
how to facilitate collaborative R&D on environmentally sound technologies under the UNFCCC and 
how to engage the business community.24 
4.4. Flexible Mechanisms 
On the Clean Development Mechanism, developing countries once again stressed the importance of 
equitable regional distribution of CDM projects, especially concerning Africa. More than 3/4 of 
emission credits are generated by CDM projects in the three largest host countries China, India and 
Brazil. In the final CMP decision, it was decided, inter alia, to provide particular support for host 
countries with less than 10 registered projects.25 Loans will be granted to pre-finance the development 
of projects, validation and the first verification. In addition, registration fees have to be paid only after 
the first issuance of credits. 
 
As a further reform step, the CMP decided to introduce an appeals procedure against decisions of 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs)—the entities charged with validating and verifying 
projects—and the CDM Executive Board (EB). In addition, the CMP assigned the EB to reinforce the 
monitoring of the DOEs’ performance and publish relevant information. A further step to strengthen 
the environmental integrity of the CDM is the introduction of standardised baselines, i.e. the definition 
of benchmarks for specific project types. Their design, however, remains unclear. The SBSTA is to 
work on modalities and procedures for developing standardised baselines and report back to CMP 6. 
  
The guidance on JI 26  adopted by the CMP is rather general. The CMP requested the Joint 
Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) to strengthen its relations with approval bodies, 
auditors and project developers, to clarify the profundity of project verifications by the certifiers and 
to report to the coming CMP on its experience with the mechanism. 
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  Second interim report of the Global Environment Facility on the progress made in carrying out the Poznan strategic 
programme on technology transfer, FCCC/SBI/    /   ,    November     . 24	  Supra, note   . 25	  Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fifth session, held 
in Copenhagen from   to    December     , Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its fifth session, Decision  /CMP. , Further guidance relating to the 
clean development mechanism, FCCC/KP/CMP/    /   /Add. ,    March     . 26	  Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fifth session, held 
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5. Assessing the Copenhagen Outcome – The World 
on a >3°C Trajectory 
Viewed in a broader context, the road from Bali to Copenhagen has not been without its successes. In 
particular, the Copenhagen deadline injected a significant dynamic into national discussions. One 
country after the other elaborated its targets and actions and presented them to the international 
audience. This dynamic would hardly have happened without the Copenhagen deadline. In stark 
contrast, the formal outcome of Copenhagen is only a political declaration, and not even this 
declaration was supported by all countries. 
 
55 countries met the 31 January deadline for inscribing targets and actions in the annexes in the CA. 
By mid-April 76 countries had made submissions. Content-wise most submissions did not deviate 
from the pledges made before Copenhagen. Canada weakened its pledge from -3% by 2020 to +3, 
while Iceland strengthened its pledge from -15% to -30% against 1990.27 
 
Collectively, the pledges add up to much less than would be required to maintain a good chance of 
meeting the 2°C target, let alone the 1.5°C target. The “Climate Action Tracker” by Ecofys, Climate 
Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research concludes that current pledges would 
lead to a temperature increase of more than 3°C by 2100.28 
 
Based on analysis by McKinsey, Project Catalyst gives very similar numbers. Project Catalyst also 
highlights that if emissions are not brought on a 2°C trajectory by 2020, it would hardly be possible to 
return to a 2°C trajectory post-2020. The main reason is that massive amounts of capital stock will be 
built and replaced until 2020. For example, more than half of the power supply required in 2020 has 
yet to be built. If these additions and replacements of existing stock are built using high emission 
technology, achieving the necessary reductions by 2030 would require abandoning huge amounts of 
capital stock before the end of its useful life.29 
 
On finance, the Accord touches upon the two most critical issues, mobilisation of the needed amount 
of financial resources and an equitable and effective institutional structure of the funding mechanisms. 
However, details on “effective and efficient fund arrangements” are missing entirely in the Accord, as 
well as any attempt to quantify the finance that will be made available by when. Also, there is no clear 
language on whether this “new multilateral funding” will be truly additional to existing Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) commitments. 
6. Negotiating in a Climate of Fear 
The ultimate cause for the weak outcome of Copenhagen is easy to discern. There is an almost 
universally-held belief that protecting the climate is going to impose substantial economic costs, and 
that therefore this “burden” can only be taken up if shared equitably by all major emitters.  
 
This fear of economic loss prevails even though various studies have shown that the risk of “carbon 
leakage” is actually much more moderate than assumed and that most industries should be able to 	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adjust to strengthened climate policies without state support or protection from outside competitors.30 
It is apparently also unmoved by numerous studies showing that not only developing but also 
industrialised countries dispose of substantial “no regret” emission reduction potential, studies not 
only produced by environmental think tanks but also by more mainstream analysts such as 
McKinsey.31 
 
Many are now asking whether a setting where more than 190 countries negotiate is actually up to the 
challenge of rapidly solving the climate problem. The critical point, however, is not so much the 
number of participants but rather the lack of political will. The last years have in fact seen quite a 
number of small-group discussions in the G8, G20 and the Major Economies Forum. Yet, these talks 
have been plagued by the same divisions as the UNFCCC negotiations. 
 
A breakthrough will arguably only be achieved if one of the major economic powers breaks with the 
“burden” narrative and convinces itself that protecting the climate is in its own best interest 
irrespective of what anybody else is doing. As long as climate leadership is seen as a recipe for 
economic disaster, countries will never move up to the necessary level of ambition. By contrast, if one 
of the major economic powers decided to forge ahead and get serious about creating a low-carbon 
economy, it can be assumed that the other countries would quickly follow suit for fear of being left 
behind. 
 
Due to its massive economic and technological potential, the USA would theoretically be the first 
candidate to take the lead on creating a low-carbon economy. However, even though much has moved 
under the Obama administration, the state of discussion in the USA is still years behind that in most 
other countries. The rest of the world might therefore want to consider whether the way forward 
should lead around rather than through the USA. 
 
The second candidate for taking the lead is the EU. History shows that any major progress in the 
climate negotiations came about when the EU was able to form a “green coalition” with progressive 
developing countries and thus isolate the naysayers. The EU’s strategy in the run-up to Copenhagen 
was the exact opposite: The EU’s main priority seemed to be to create a united front with the other 
Annex I countries and in particular to get the USA on board. Crucially, this involved publicly 
abandoning the Kyoto Protocol in favour of a new universal framework that would bind all major 
emitters. With this move, the EU crossed the most important red line of developing countries, who 
now perceived the EU as having joined the camp of those who want to drastically weaken the legal 
status of industrialised countries’ commitments. At the same time, it was equally clear that the USA 
was not ready to commit to any system of binding numerical mitigation targets that would be similar 
to the Kyoto Protocol. A single universal framework could therefore only be weaker than Kyoto. In 
sum, the EU antagonised potential allies among developing countries without having any prospect of 
getting anything in return from the USA. 
 
A key factor is that the enlarged EU with its now 27 member states is no longer the essentially 
Western European EU that secured the Berlin Mandate and rescued the Kyoto Protocol after the US 
defection. The new member states are much less wealthy than the old ones and to a certain extent it is 
understandable why countries such as Poland, which derives more than 90% of its electricity from 
coal, have difficulties with committing to aggressive mitigation actions. To be able to regain its former 
international stature, the EU will therefore probably need to work out a long-term internal effort 
sharing arrangement as the basis for presenting a united front internationally. As part of this, the 
economic powerhouses of Western Europe will probably need to offer the new members states 
substantial and reliable support for transitioning to a clean energy future. 	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A third possibility is that China will continue to accelerate its decarbonisation efforts and ultimately 
convince itself that meeting its development goals and controlling emissions are actually compatible. 
Already today, China has emerged as major player on the renewable energy scene. A recent report 
shows that Chinese investments in clean energy jumped by 50% in 2009 alone to reach $34.6 billion, 
far more than any other G20 country and up from $2.5 billion only 5 years ago.32 Another recent study 
notes that clean energy will be one of the world’s largest industries by 2020, accounting for as much 
as $2.3 trillion—with China right in the middle of it.33 
 
Also in the field of energy efficiency, China has been accelerating its efforts again since 2005, aiming 
at a 20% reduction of energy intensity per GDP in the period 2005-2010. China will continue its 
efficiency efforts in the next five-year-plan period (2011-2015). The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace notes regarding the much-maligned Chinese target to improve its carbon intensity 
by 40-45% by 2020: “No developing country in economic history—other than post-Mao China—has 
cut its energy-related greenhouse gas emissions growth so deeply for so long (…) The current energy 
intensity policy (…) can legitimately be described as severe, even draconian (…) The policy has 
forced closure of tens of thousands of factories, power plants, and production lines that failed to meet 
the standards.”34 
 
Currently, however, while wind mills are going up in China at record speed, so are coal power plants. 
The country already has one foot planted in the future, but its other foot remains rooted in the fossil 
past. But should the Chinese decide to put both feet on the path to the future, the enormous labour 
pool, low labour costs and rising technological capacity of this country of 1.3 billion people might 
make for bleak prospects for industrialised countries who failed to make use of their technological 
edge while they still had it. 
7. Which Way Forward for International Climate 
Policy? 
Clearly, Parties are not ready to agree on a comprehensive global framework to fight climate change. 
At the same time, the message from climate science is clear: action over the next years is crucial if 
there is to be any chance of keeping global warming below 2°C.  
 
It may therefore be sensible to take a piecemeal approach to constructing the future climate regime 
and prioritise actions over form while the fundamentals of a comprehensive agreement are negotiated. 
COP 16/CMP 6 in Cancún should therefore adopt an interim framework that is capable of delivering 
immediate emission reductions and laying the groundwork for eventual adoption of a comprehensive 
treaty or treaties. Such a Cancún Plan of Action could have the following key planks: First, a firm 
mandate to negotiate a comprehensive treaty or treaties within a realistic timeframe, such as 2015, and 
second, an interim framework to cover the interval including the following elements: 
 
• A firm commitment to agree on industrialised country targets for a five-year second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol by COP 17 in 2011 at the latest. Preferably, 
industrialised countries should take the lead and agree on their targets at COP 16 already and 
most countries’ level of ambition should be substantially strengthened. 
• Integration of US climate legislation, which urgently needs to be passed before COP 16. 	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• Transposition of the NAMAs notified under the CA into the UNFCCC process, with a firm 
commitment to develop a fully functional system for implementing these NAMAs, associated 
financial, technological and capacity building support by Annex I countries and MRV under 
the LCA track by COP 17 in 2011 at the latest. These would initially be adopted in the form of 
COP decisions, establishing the basis for working towards a treaty format by 2015 
• Immediate agreement on finance and support for adaptation building on the Adaptation Fund 
 
Continuation of the Kyoto Protocol is a fundamental condition of non-Annex I engagement, and this is 
a valid demand as Annex I countries have basically failed to do their homework for almost 20 years. 
When factoring out the countries of the former Eastern Bloc whose economies collapsed in the 1990s, 
emissions from industrialised countries actually increased by 12.8% between 1990 and 2007.35 A 
demonstration by industrialised countries that they are finally prepared to actually take the lead is 
therefore a fundamental element for building the necessary trust that will be needed to eventually 
forge a comprehensive agreement. Moreover, non-Annex I countries have done what Annex I have 
demanded. They have stepped up and submitted credible mitigation targets and actions that are able to 
deliver substantial emission reductions. 
 
The one actor capable of securing a second Kyoto commitment period is the EU. So far, the EU has 
been driven by fear that all the other Annex I countries might jump ship and leave the EU countries as 
the only ones who are regulated under the Protocol after 2012. But instead of being paralysed by the 
prospect of such a vicious circle dynamic, the EU should take up the challenge to rescue the Kyoto 
Protocol a second time and create a virtuous circle, securing Kyoto commitments from the other 
Annex I countries one after the other. 
 
To regain its credibility, the EU should first step up its own target for 2020. Despite its claims to the 
contrary, even the conditional EU target of 30% never reflected its “fair share”. Most effort sharing 
proposals conclude that a “fair share” of the EU in the global effort to move to a 2°C trajectory would 
be a target of at least 35%.36 Second, due to the impacts of the recession, the EU would have to work 
hard in order NOT to meet its unilateral 20% target.37 
 
Furthermore, the EU will have to mend fences with developing countries. Apart from returning to the 
Kyoto framework and stepping up its own target this will crucially involve making good on its 
financial promises. In addition to actually delivering the money, this money should in fact be new and 
additional instead of simply being repurposed from development budgets. A major share of adaptation 
funding should be provided to the Adaptation Fund, which has the full backing of developing 
countries. 
 
As for the LCA track, once the package approach is given up and the issue linkage with Annex I 
targets is removed, agreements might be found much more easily. For example, the facilitator of the 
REDD-plus negotiations recounts that agreement on REDD-plus was within reach in Copenhagen, but 
was held back by the controversies about the fundamentals of the new regime.38 
 
As for the USA, the time for action is now. The mid-term election in November 2010 is currently 
expected to lead to Democratic losses or even an overall Republican victory, which would probably 
forestall US climate action for years to come. Leaders from the EU and other countries should 
therefore communicate directly to the Obama administration and members of Congress that passage of 
climate legislation in 2010 is of vital importance. 	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Evidently, such messages will be all the more credible the more they are backed up by commitments 
from the governments who send them. And it bears reminding that increasing numbers of citizens, 
states, cities and businesses are demanding that the USA should step up to the plate. If the other 
Annex I countries go ahead with a second Kyoto commitment period and non-Annex I countries go 
ahead with credibly implementing NAMAs, the USA might quickly find itself in a position of being 
the big laggard of international climate policy. It may be hoped that such a situation would be 
intolerable to the more progressive elements within the USA and help to create the political space that 
is needed to pass US climate legislation. 	  
